Abstract-It is well known that network coding can improve the secrecy of a network that is represented by a graph with edges tapped by an eavesdropper. However, the application of such secure network coding to emerging problems in informationtheoretic secrecy in wireless networks has been limited; in particular, the graph-based wiretap network approach does not readily extend to the physical wireless network. In this paper, we consider the impact of such an extension on scaling laws for wireless networks. We first employ simple examples to illustrate how an extension of the secure network coding approach can address difficult problems that have plagued wireless network security; for example, relaxing the known eavesdropper location assumption or avoiding the use of artificial noise generation. Based on this understanding, we then add secure network coding approaches to recent constructions for secrecy scaling in large wireless networks, most notably achieving secure pernode throughput in large wireless networks in the presence of an arbitrary number of non-collaborating eavesdroppers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Physical-layer based information-theoretic security allows a secrecy guarantee without making assumptions on the current and future computational capabilities of the adversary. However, information-theoretic security relies on an advantage on the transmitter-receiver channel versus the transmittereavesdropper channel that can be difficult to guarantee in a wireless communication network, where the eavesdropper might be very near to the source, might employ a highlydirective antenna to obtain a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) gain, etc. Hence, one could argue that information-theoretic security in the wireless network has simply traded assumptions on the (long-term) computational capabilities of the eavesdropper for assumptions on the (short-term) operating environment. This is particularly troublesome in situations where the eavesdropper location is unknown, which, while likely the standard operating regime for a passive eavesdropper, has been only lightly addressed in the literature.
Methods to address the problem of having an eavesdropper of unknown location (and thus possibly close to the source) in a wireless communication network have often involved the rather intricate generation of artificial noise to guarantee C. Capar, and D. Goeckel are with the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, MA, 01003 USA. Email: {ccapar,goeckel}@ecs.umass.edu.
This research was sponsored by the National Science Foundation under grants CNS-0905349 and CNS-1018464, and by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and the U.K. Ministry of Defence under Agreement Number W911NF-06-3-0001. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the author(s) and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the U.S. Government, the U.K. Ministry of Defence or the U.K. Government. The U.S. and U.K. Governments are authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon. some minimum noise floor at the eavesdropper, regardless of his/her location [1] , [2] , [3] , [4] . However, in recent work on quite separate operating scenarios [5] , [6] , a different approach has emerged. In particular, the work of [5] and [6] demonstrate, respectively, how the employment of "secret sharing" [7] and two-way communication can greatly improve the security performance. This motivates a more careful study of the application of general principles from the area of "secure network coding" [8] , [9] to the wireless security problem. While the field of secure network coding is relatively well understood, the mapping of the wireless security problem to its framework is not clear. Secure network coding is a graphbased approach in which eavesdroppers tap edges (or not), which does not map well to the wireless environment where there are no edges but rather there is a continuum of SNRs.
In this paper, motivated by the scenario-focused work of [5] and [6] , we take a more general view and study the utility of network coding approaches to help guarantee informationtheoretic secrecy in the wireless environment. We present "toy" examples in Section III to demonstrate the salient aspects, and then show in Section IV how the insight gained allows us to improve secrecy scaling.
II. MODEL
Here we describe the main tools used in the paper. The first is the wiretap network model [8] , which is an abstract graph-based tool that allows a formal way to check whether secure communication is possible using network coding [9] . The second is a very useful tool called the secrecy graph [10] which allows one to map a given physical wireless network topology (including eavesdroppers) to a graph which we study using the wiretap network model.
A. Wiretap Network
Let G = (V, E) be a directed graph, where V is the set of legitimate wireless nodes including one source node s, and one destination node d. E is the set of edges representing the connections between the nodes. Assume that all nodes in V have a path to d. There is a wiretapper who has access to what is transmitted on some of the edges. More specifically, let A = {A 1 , A 2 , · · · , A m }, where A i ⊆ E, i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , m}, be the (known) collection of subsets of edges that can be wiretapped. The wiretapper has access to any member of the set A, but no more than one member. Here, for the described wiretap network, the question of interest is whether it is possible to send a secret message from s to d, i.e., such that the wiretapper has no information about the message delivered to d. In [9] , the sufficient and necessary condition for securely connecting 978-1-4673-3140-1/12/$31.00 ©2012 IEEE s to d is given. Let S = {S 1 , S 2 , · · · , S ℓ } be the collection of all subsets S i ⊆ V which contain the source node s. For any S i ∈ S, let δ(S i ) be the collection of incoming and outgoing edges connecting S i to the rest of the nodes. Then, a message can be securely sent from s to d if and only if δ(S i ) ̸ ⊆ A j for any i, j [9] . The necessity of this condition is clear: if some A i contains all the edges between a source cut and the rest of the network, then the wiretapper can read whatever is coming in and out of the source and secrecy cannot be possible. On the other hand, if at least one edge is not wiretapped, this result says secret communication is indeed possible.
B. Secrecy Graph
The secrecy graph is introduced in [10] to study the secrecy capability of a wireless network. Here, we start with the topology (e.g., on R 2 ) of the network with given locations of the legitimate nodes ϕ = {x i }, and the eavesdroppers ψ = {y i }. Next each legitimate node x i is connected to another node x j with a directed edge if x j is within x i 's transmit range, hence forming a graph. Then we turn this "baseline graph" into a directed "secrecy graph" by deleting unsecure edges. In particular, we delete the edge from x i to x j if there is an eavesdropper y k which is closer to
where d is the Euclidean distance. We call the edge (x i , x j ) wiretapped by y k . Note that the directed edge (x j , x i ) may still be secure. Finally, we turn all directed edges in the secrecy graph to undirected edges, and the resulting graph is called the enhanced secrecy graph [10] .
III. NETWORK CODING TECHNIQUES TO AID SECRECY
In this section, we first show three examples of small networks where we demonstrate how network coding helps wireless secrecy. In all of these examples, the topology is a small square grid and the legitimate nodes are positioned on the corners with connections only to their nearest neighbors. These examples provide the insight to how network coding helps secrecy and serve as the basis for the secrecy result for the infinite square grid network given as the last example.
A. A simple two-way scheme
We start with a very simple example given in Fig. 1 An example showing that a secure incoming connection to a source may be enough to deliver a secret message from the source to the destination, although the connection from the source to the destination is wiretapped.
, and the secrecy condition is satisfied, which means there is a way to send a secret message from s to d. A secret message x is sent from s to d in two steps. In the first step, d generates a random string k and sends it to s. In the second step, s uses k as a one-time pad, and sends the string c = x ⊕ k, where ⊕ is the XOR operation. In the end, d has the strings k, c and extracts x; however, e only has the string c and can obtain no information about x. This example illustrates the powerful idea that an incoming connection to the source can be very valuable for secrecy, and this will be exploited in the examples below. The fact that two nodes can be securely connected as long as one of the edges is secure was recognized in [10] , and is the reason for the introduction of the enhanced secrecy graph to check secure connectivity.
B. Non-collaborating eavesdroppers of known location
Here, we have four legitimate nodes V = {s, a, b, d} on the four corners of a square, and two eavesdroppers e 1 , e 2 located in the middle of the edges between the pairs s, a, and s, b (Fig. 2) . The edges in both directions between s, a and s, b are wiretapped, hence the resulting secrecy graph is disconnected. Although the source is disconnected from both of its neighbors in both directions, we show that with the help of network coding, delivering a secure message from s to d is possible.
We first check whether the secrecy condition is satisfied. Assuming the two eavesdroppers do not collaborate, we have the following sets of wiretapped edges. A = {A 1 , A 2 }, where
Now consider the cuts S = {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 , S 4 }, where Notice that δ(S i ) ̸ ⊆ A j , for any i, j. Hence, the condition for secrecy is satisfied and it is possible to securely connect s to d. In Fig. 2 , we describe a protocol that achieves such. First, nodes a, b generate random strings k 1 , k 2 , respectively and send them over their outgoing edges successively. Next, s calculates c = x⊕k 1 ⊕k 2 , and sends it. Finally, a forwards the string c to d. The receiver d now has the strings c, k 1 , k 2 and can extract the secret message x. At the end of the protocol, the eavesdropper e 1 has the strings k 1 , c, but misses k 2 . Similarly, e 2 has c, k 2 but not k 1 . Therefore, the eavesdroppers do not have any information about the message x. Also, note that the message is not revealed to the nodes a, b.
C. Eavesdroppers of Unknown Location
For our third example, consider the square grid given in Fig. 3 with the two squares labeled B 1 , B 2 as shown. There are six legitimate nodes V = {s, d, r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }. A very important difference in this example is that the location of the eavesdroppers are unknown. There may an arbitrary number of (non-collaborating) eavesdroppers located anywhere inside the square grid except at the exact same locations with the legitimate nodes. Here, to check the secrecy condition, for each of the squares, we consider an optimally located eavesdropper.
Let A 1 be the worst-case set of edges that can be wiretapped by an eavesdropper located inside B Fig. 3 . An example which shows how network coding also helps against eavesdroppers of unknown location. The idea is to partition the network into regions and consider the worst-case wiretapper in each region.
We next describe a protocol that securely connects s to d as shown in Fig. 3 . In the first step, nodes r 1 , r 2 generate the random strings k 1 , k 2 , respectively, and send them on their outgoing edges. Then, the source replies with the string c = x ⊕ k 1 ⊕ k 2 . The protocol completes by delivering the strings k 1 , k 2 to the destination d as shown in Fig. 3 . In the end, d extracts the message x from the received strings. An eavesdropper located inside B 1 is guaranteed to miss the string k 2 , while an eavesdropper inside B 2 misses k 1 . Hence, regardless of their location, no eavesdropper in the network has any information about x. In addition, the message is not revealed to any legitimate node except d.
D. Application: Secrecy on Infinite Square Lattice
Here, we consider the network on the infinite square grid. Secure connectivity of this network was previously studied in [10] , [11] and percolation thresholds were calculated. Here, we show how the network coding techniques presented in the small examples above improve secure connectivity in this network. The following theorem states our result:
Theorem 1: Consider a square lattice network, where the legitimate nodes are located on Z 2 and the eavesdroppers are arbitrarily distributed with their locations unknown. The eavesdroppers are assumed not to collaborate. Then, the node at the origin is securely connected to any legitimate node on the lattice for any number of eavesdroppers.
Proof: The result can be proven by showing how a node s at the origin (0, 0) can be securely connected to nodes at some selected points on the lattice and connection to other points can be found similarly. For example, s at (0, 0) can be connected to d located at (1, 0) by simply using the protocol given in Fig. 3 with the nodes at (0, 1), (0, -1), (1, 1), (1, -1) employed as relays. The basic idea in connecting to any point is that the source receives two keys k 1 , k 2 from relays on two opposite directions, and these keys also arrive to d from two opposite directions. As a second example, Fig. 4 shows a security protocol connecting (0, 0) to (1, 1). Similar secrecy
(1,1) Fig. 4 . Secrecy protocol connecting a source node at the origin (0, 0) to a node at (1, 1).
protocols to connect to other sample points are omitted due to space constraints. Note that in the percolation results in [10] , [11] , the origin being connected to another node refers to the existence of a "path" starting at the origin and ending at the node, whereas in our case we refer to the origin being "connected" to a node if it is possible to execute a security protocol that can deliver a secret message to this node.
IV. SECRECY CAPACITY SCALING
In this section, we present our main result, where we consider the secrecy capacity scaling problem. For a random network with n nodes, the seminal work of [12] showed an achievable amount of per-node information rate that scales as 1/ √ n log n. Recent work explores how this scaling is affected if the network also contains (randomly located) eavesdroppers and the throughput achieved should be informationtheoretically secure. It is shown that [13] , [14] , [5] , the same throughput scaling can be achieved securely in the presence of some number of eavesdroppers. For example, [5] shows that the number of eavesdroppers (with unknown location) should grow more slowly than n/ log n for the achieved throughput to remain secure. In these and other secrecy scaling results, the main feature constraining the number of eavesdroppers that can be tolerated is the requirement that legitimate nodes should be free from very nearby eavesdroppers, and this requirement still applies even when the location of the eavesdroppers are assumed known [14] .
The reason behind this major restriction is that whenever a node initiates the flow of a secret message, a very nearby eavesdropper has a significant SNR advantage over any receiver for any signal transmitted by this node. However, as shown in the previous section, one major advantage of network coding techniques is that an incoming connection to a source can be used to enable secrecy. For an incoming signal, the SNR values at a source and a very nearby eavesdropper are almost the same, i.e., the use of network coding evens out the SNR gap. Hence, a physical-layer secrecy scheme that achieves secrecy at equal SNRs can be used to initiate the secure transmission.
The following theorem states our main result. In the construction used to prove this result, we assume that, for all transmissions in the wireless network, the sender node a employs a physical-layer secrecy scheme to deliver the message to the receiver node b at some fixed rate, which is designed to guarantee secrecy from any eavesdropper e that has roughly the same signal quality with b (or worse). More precisely, for some decoding threshold γ for the signal-to-interference-andnoise ratio (SINR), and some (small) δ such that 0 < δ < 1, a sends bits to b at some fixed rate R bits per second, which is kept secret from any eavesdropper e if 1) SINR b γ, 2) SINR e (1 + δ)SINR b . One example of such a secrecy scheme is the low-complexity on-off method in [15] , which utilizes fading by sending only at instants when the main channel gain is larger than a certain threshold in a given transmission period, and is shown to achieve a positive secrecy rate even when the eavesdropper channel is more capable than the main channel. Many other methods are available (e.g., see [16] ).
Theorem 2: Consider an extended two-dimensional network, where legitimate nodes are placed according to a Poisson point process with density 1 over a torus formed by wrapping around a square region of size [0,
at the edges. Legitimate nodes are matched into n source-destination pairs uniformly at random. In addition to the legitimate nodes, eavesdroppers are arbitrarily distributed with their location unknown. Eavesdroppers are assumed not to collaborate. Each source-destination pair can achieve a throughput that scales as 1/ √ n log n with probability one as n → ∞. The throughput achieved is secure for any number of eavesdroppers.
Proof: We present a construction that achieves the stated secrecy property. The construction consists of a routing algorithm and a time division multiplexing scheme. For this construction, the square region is divided into square cells of side length c(n) = √ log n. For each source-destination pair s-d, s generates four "packets" for each secret message x to be conveyed from s to d. First three packets w 1 , w 2 , w 3 are generated randomly, and the last packet w 4 is set such that x = w 1 ⊕ w 2 ⊕ w 3 ⊕ w 4 . For convenience, we consider these packets as belonging to four different colors, i.e., we refer to w i as belonging to the ith color. Note that no information about x can be obtained unless all four packets are decoded.
A. Routing Algorithm
For each source-destination pair, we define four paths connecting the source to the destination. The basic idea is that these packets are sent on separate distant paths and since an eavesdropper in the network cannot be close to many paths at once, it is guaranteed to miss at least one packet. This argument is true except for eavesdroppers very close to s or d, which is addressed by a careful handling of the initiation of the packet transmissions at the source, and the delivery of the packets to the destination. Hence, our routing algorithm consists of three stages: draining, routing, and delivery.
Draining: For each source node s, we define a square region of size 7 × 7 cells with the source cell at its center as the "source base" (see Fig. 5 ). The four corner cells of the source base are designated as the "relay cells". Four legitimate nodes (Right) The delivery of the four packets to the destination is shown. As is the case for the draining phase, due to the location of the relays, no eavesdropper can be close enough to all relays at once to collect all four packets. r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 are selected from these four relay regions, and the packets w i are conveyed to the relays using the two-way scheme described in Section III. For example, the node r 1 generates a random key k 1 and sends it to s, and s replies with c 1 = w 1 ⊕ k 1 , and r 1 extracts the packet w 1 (Fig. 5) . Routing: We define four paths between the source and the destination bases (Fig. 6) . Each packet w i is carried on a different path. The paths consist of vertical or horizontal lines, which are traversed by the packets in single-cell hops, where the packet is delivered to a node in the next cell on the path. Two paths leave the top two relay cells on a vertical line, and arrive to the correponding relay cells in the destination base on a vertical line while keeping the same spacing (Fig. 6 ). The same is true for the paths leaving the bottom relay cells.
Delivery: For each destination node d, a "destination base" is defined in the same way as the source base (see Fig. 5 ). Again, the four corners are labeled as relay cells. After a packet reaches a relay cell in the destination base, the packet is delivered from the relay directly to d by reaching over multiple cells as done for the draining case. Once all four packets arrive to d, it decodes the secret message x by XORing the packets.
Remark: Some special cases need to be considered: (i) Source and destination bases which are roughly vertically aligned: the paths leave the source base and arrive at the destination base on horizontal lines. (ii) The source and the destination bases overlap: the secret message is delivered via a helper node. In particular, a helper node is selected from the network, and the secret message is delivered first to this helper node, and then from the helper node to the destination node using the routing algorithm described above for both stages. The helper node is selected from a cell that is far enough away from the source and the destination bases to allow employing the routing algorithm as described above. Details are omitted due to space constraints.
B. Time Division Multiplexing Scheme
Time is divided into three phases corresponding to the draining, routing, and delivery stages.
Draining: The draining phase is divided into eight frames. The first four frames are for transmissions of the keys from the relays to the sources, and the last four frames are for the responses of the sources. Each frame consists of a constant number of time slots, where cells take turns for signal transmissions employing a standard spatial reuse scheme where cells transmitting in the same time slot are regularly spaced in the network (e.g., see [17] ). Hence, at the end of each frame, it is ensured that each cell has transmitted once.
Routing: The routing phase is divided into four frames for each type of packet. In the ith frame, packets of color i are routed. Each frame is further divided into time slots again employing a spatial reuse scheme. In each time slot, relaying nodes from the active cells deliver their packets to the next cell on the path.
Delivery: The delivery phase consists of four frames for the transmission of the packets of four colors. Again, each frame is divided into time slots, and transmissions are done as in the draining phase.
The proof completes by showing that: (i) this construction is feasible, (ii) it achieves a per-node throughput on the order of 1/ √ n log n, and (iii) the achieved throughput is secure. The first two statements can be shown by standard arguments used in similar works (see e.g., [5] , [13] , [17] ), and we omit the detailed proof here. The throughput achieved by the construction is found by considering the throughput constraint imposed by each phase. For the draining and delivery phases, the difference in our construction compared to a standard construction is that transmissions require multicell hops, and that these phases complete in more than one transmissions. However, these both bring only a constant factor to the throughput achieved and do not affect the scaling. The difference in the routing phase is that each message requires four packets to be carried, which again does not affect the order. It can be shown that the performance bottleneck is due to the routing phase, and since the relaying load in each cell grows with √ n log n (see e.g., Appendix II in [5] ), the overall per-node throughput scales as 1/ √ n log n. Finally, note that the construction requires nodes to transmit with power that is proportonal to (log n) α/2 , where α > 2 is the path loss exponent of the medium.
Next we show that for each source-destination pair s-d, each message x is delivered from s to d securely. For secrecy, we show that an eavesdropper located anywhere in the network is guaranteed to miss at least one packet out of the four packets after listening to all the transmissions required for the delivery of x. First consider the draining phase. Due to the relative locations of the relays with respect to the source, any given eavesdropper e satisfies d(e, r i ) d(s, r i ) for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} (Fig. 5) . Hence, for the transmission of k i from r i to s, the received signal power at s is larger than the received signal power at e. In addition, even with the interference at e ignored, the spatial reuse scheme can be designed such that the interference at s is low enough to allow SINR e (1 + δ)SINR b . Therefore, k i is delivered to s but not to e; hence, e misses the packet w i . Therefore, any eavesdropper is guaranteed to miss at least one packet, and the message x is not leaked during the draining phase. A similar argument can be made for the delivery phase. The four packets arrive to d from four directions and any eavesdropper e satisfies d(e, r i ) d(d, r i ) for some i. Outside the bases, the packets are carried on paths with some minimum spacing; hence, no eavesdropper can be close enough to many paths at once, thus establishing secrecy during the routing phase. Also note that it can be ensured that an eavesdropper cannot decode a packet by combining observations from all hops on the packet's path as proved in [14] . Finally, it can be easily verified that no eavesdropper can collect the four packets by listening to all three phases. Therefore, using this construction, as n grows, each sourcedestination pair can share on the order of 1/ √ n log n secret bits per second for any number of independent eavesdroppers arbitrarily distributed to the network.
V. CONCLUSION
Network coding techniques have the potential to improve information-theoretic secrecy in wireless networks, most notably by enabling the secure connection of one node to another in the presence of very nearby eavesdroppers. After illustrating the benefits through small examples, we show that n randomly located nodes can share per-node secret information at a rate on the order of 1/ √ n log n, for any number of arbitrarily distributed eavesdroppers of unknown location. This improves on previous results, which showed the same secure throughput scaling could be achieved if the number of randomly located eavesdroppers scales more slowly than n/ log n. This work partially completes a line of research that originated with the secrecy-capacity tradeoffs in asymptotically large networks of [13] . In [13] , even when multi-user diversity and cooperative jamming were employed, the near eavesdropper problem severely limited the number of uniformly distributed eavesdroppers that could be tolerated in the network. In [18] and [5] , we began to realize the utility of modifications at higher layers in resolving difficult secrecy problems caused by certain geometries of the system nodes and eavesdroppers, but we still were not able to address eavesdroppers very near the nodes originating messages. The work here addresses this last problem and thus allows for a secure per-session throughput of O(1/ √ n log n) in the presence of an arbitrarily located set of non-collaborating eavesdroppers.
